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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: PALLADIUM OF
LIBERTY OR ACADEMIC PARADOX?
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX. By
Martin H. Redish.1 Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
2017. Pp. 260. $ 55.00 (hardcover).
Nelson Lund2
In 1992, the people of Arkansas voted to require that their
U.S. Representatives and Senators run as write-in candidates if
they wished to serve more than three terms or two terms,
respectively. This new provision of the Arkansas Constitution was
challenged under the U.S. Constitution’s Qualifications Clauses.
The first of these clauses provides that no one may serve as a
Representative “who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
which he shall be chosen.”3 The provision for Senators is identical
except that the age requirement is thirty years, and the citizenship
requirement is nine years.4
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the people’s choice by
a five-four vote.5 The authors of the majority and dissenting
opinions, Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas
respectively, engaged in an exceptionally elaborate debate. Both
opinions seemed to recognize, at least implicitly, that a clear and
definitive resolution of the case could not be derived directly from
the language of the Qualifications Clauses, or from their

1. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern
University Pritzker School of Law.
2. University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. For
helpful comments, I am grateful to Stephen G. Gilles.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
5. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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legislative history, or from the Court’s own precedents. For
Justice Stevens, the deciding consideration was a political theory:
[T]he text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant
historical materials, and, most importantly, the “basic
principles of our democratic system” all demonstrate that the
Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States
from exercising any [control over congressional qualifications]
and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.6

The “basic principles” to which Stevens refers here are taken
from a quotation, to which he recurs over and over again, that has
been attributed to Alexander Hamilton at the New York ratifying
convention: “the people should choose whom they please to
govern them.”7
Justice Thomas raised two major objections to this use of
democratic theory. First, the people of Arkansas in fact did
choose whom they pleased to govern them, namely individuals
elected from among those who met the qualifications set out in
the Arkansas Constitution.8 Second, there is no “basic principle”
of our democratic system that requires the people to express their
choices only in elections and never in their constitutions, and we
have unchallengeable proof that no such principle exists. The
provisions of the Constitution that Stevens thinks the people of
Arkansas violated are themselves in violation of the very same rule
that Stevens claims is a fundamental principle of our democratic
system.9 Those Clauses forbid the people to choose to be
governed by a twenty-four-year-old, or by a recently naturalized
citizen, or by someone who does not inhabit the state, even if
that’s who pleases them.
Rather than respond to Stevens with an alternative theory of
democracy, Thomas relies on a legal principle that he thinks is
implied by the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.10 This
principle is that the federal government has only the powers
granted by the Constitution and that the States have all the
6. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
7. Stevens repeats this quotation, or parts of it, at least six times. 514 U.S. at 783,
793, 795 (twice), 796 n.12 (without quotation marks), 819.
8. Id. at 878–79 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. For a critique of the Stevens opinion that focuses on democratic theory rather
than on the law, see Nelson Lund, Rousseau and Direct Democracy (with a Note on the
Supreme Court’s Term Limits Decision), 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 459, 501–09
(2004).
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powers that the Constitution has not taken from them, expressly
or by clear implication.11 The Qualifications Clauses
unambiguously establish minimum standards, and the
Constitution gives Congress no power to supplement those
qualifications with additional criteria. The States, however, are
not forbidden to add new qualifications, and the Arkansas
constitutional provision therefore does not violate the Clauses.
If you are attracted by Justice Stevens’s opinion, you may like
the approach taken in Martin Redish’s book about judicial
independence. Like Stevens, Redish resolves important questions
on the basis of a political theory that he believes is implicit in the
U.S. Constitution. If you are more impressed with Justice
Thomas’s arguments, as I am, you will be skeptical about many of
the claims Redish makes. In this review, I will briefly summarize
the principal arguments in the book, and explain why I think its
major conclusions are mistaken.
I.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY

It is neither novel nor controversial to say, as this book does,
that an important feature of our political system is the
independence that the Constitution gives to the federal judiciary.
The exact nature and extent of that independence, however, is in
some respects debatable, and Redish makes some innovative
arguments about the judiciary’s proper role.
Notwithstanding his novel suggestions, Redish regards
himself as a kind of constitutional conservative. Until recently, he
believes, it was widely and properly assumed that the Constitution
is a written document that was adopted in order “to enshrine a
constitutional democracy that would effectively balance our
competing interests in celebrating majority interests with the need
to protect minority rights” (p. 15). The underlying assumption
that the Constitution is that document and nothing else has,
unfortunately, been disturbed by academic commentators whom
he calls “modernists”: constitutional realists, popular
constitutionalists, and departmentalists.12 Redish sets out to
refute these theorists in a way that will reestablish what he calls
11. 514 U.S. at 847-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. Redish takes the term “modernist” from a school of architectural design that he
dislikes.
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“traditionalism” or the “formalist traditional model” on a new
basis that he calls “premodern theory.” He then uses his new/old
theory to discover implications in the Constitution that have gone
unrecognized until now.
It is true that the contemporary legal academy has produced
a cacophony of competing theories unlike anything that existed in
the past. What does not seem true is Redish’s picture of a settled
traditionalism that was largely unchallenged until the arrival of
academic wildlings like Bruce Ackerman, Larry Kramer, and
Michael Stokes Paulsen.13 The real break with the past, it seems
to me, came with the doctrinal adventurism of the Warren and
Burger Courts, which is captured in the notion of the “living
Constitution.” That development prompted attempts at reviving
and refining the traditional theory of originalism, which in turn
provoked a storm of “noninterpretivist” counter-theorizing in
defense of the living Constitution.14
By “constitutional realists,” Redish means academics who
“challenge the premise that the complete American constitutional
regime is set forth in the singular written document we identify as
the Constitution” (p. 16). These writers argue that our supreme
law is only what is actually treated as such, which is both more and
less than what we find in the written document. Karl Llewellyn
and other legal realists of the early twentieth century fall into this
group, but Redish reserves most of his fire for some of our
contemporaries: Ackerman, Todd Pettys, and Ernest Young. In
his view, their scholarship “amounts to self and public deception”
because they “challenge the fundamental import of the
Constitution’s writtenness” (p. 31).
I agree with Redish that the Constitution is the written
document, and I do not believe any vague and changeable set of
principles has taken its place as a legal matter. Such principles,
however, undoubtedly do have effects that are sometimes almost
equivalent to constitutional amendments, and I would stress
something that Redish never acknowledges: these virtual
13. Redish is pretty tough on some of these theorists. What constitutional realists do,
for example, “is downright deceptive,” and Professors Ackerman and Ernest Young could
use some lessons from “a recent graduate of an eighth grade civics course” (pp. 32, 36).
14. The term “noninterpretivism” has gone out of fashion, perhaps because
opponents of originalism have decided it is more politic to claim that they, too, are just
interpreting the Constitution, not making it up to serve their political agendas. For an
elaboration of this point, see Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour,
3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 31 (2015).
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amendments are almost always caused or ratified by the Supreme
Court’s misinterpretations of the Constitution.
Whereas the realists generally purport to be descriptive,
Redish says that “popular constitutionalists” such as Kramer
advance a normative case for taking final authority to interpret
the Constitution away from the courts and reposing it in the
people themselves. Redish rejects this proposal on the grounds
that its real effect would be to give dangerously unchecked power
to “majority impulses,” and that it is inconsistent with the
manifestly countermajoritarian nature of the Constitution (pp. 4748).15
“Departmentalists,” exemplified for Redish by Paulsen,
argue that each branch of the federal government has
independent authority to interpret the Constitution.16 Unless such
thinkers as James Madison, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham
Lincoln can be considered “modernists,” perhaps it is advocates
of departmentalism who should be considered traditionalists.17 In
15. Although Kramer does think that popular constitutionalism is normatively
desirable, he also advances a detailed historical case, which Redish ignores, for treating it
as a once-dominant American tradition going back to the founding era. Whether Kramer’s
evidence and arguments are ultimately persuasive or not, he does not deserve to be
dismissed with the flip comment that “[t]he very notion of a countermajoritarian
Constitution refutes Kramer’s normative claim” (p. 47). One might just as easily dismiss
Redish by saying that “the very notion of the sovereignty of the people refutes his claims
about judicial supremacy.” (Tellingly, perhaps, Redish cites only a relatively short
symposium piece by Kramer, and never mentions the substantial book he published in
2004.)
16. Redish characterizes Paulsen as “[d]epartmentalism’s most vocal and extreme
proponent” (p. 38). I agree that some of Paulsen’s views are atypical, and it is therefore
unfortunate that Redish chose to focus entirely on one of his articles. A few of the endnotes
make glancing allusions to other theorists, but there is no attempt to grapple seriously with
their arguments.
17. See, e.g., Federalist No. 49 (“The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate
by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an
exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers . . .
.”); James Madison, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan. 30, 1815) (treating his own
objections to the constitutionality of the bank as “precluded in my judgment by repeated
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by
indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation”);
Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto (July 10, 1832) (“It is maintained by the advocates of the
bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by
precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent.
Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding
questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the
States can be considered as well settled. . . . If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered
the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this
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any event, Redish’s attack on this view culminates in the claim
that “judicial review requires judicial supremacy” (p. 41). His
main argument is that if the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution were not treated as the supreme law, the legislature
and executive would be able to undermine, or even completely
destroy, the countermajoritarianism that is a fundamental feature
of our political system (p. 41).
The simplest rebuttal is that judicial supremacy would enable
the courts to undermine, or even completely destroy, the popular
nature of our government. Redish does not think much of this
rebuttal. He believes that supreme authority over the
interpretation of the Constitution has to be lodged somewhere,
and that courts are rightly regarded as the least dangerous branch
(pp. 43-44). But even granting the obvious truth that courts are in
some respects less dangerous than elected officials, Redish is
wrong to think that judicial review requires judicial supremacy.
Let’s begin with Marbury v. Madison,18 which endorsed and
defended judicial review. The most logically powerful argument
in the Court’s opinion is this: faced with a conflict between the
Constitution and a statute, courts have no choice except to give
effect to the more authoritative of the two laws, namely the
Constitution.19 That logic applies to the President every bit as
much as it does to the Supreme Court, even if the President’s
interpretation of the Constitution differs from the Court’s.
Significantly, nobody on the Supreme Court has ever
accepted all the implications of Marbury’s logic. Any Justice who
did so would have to conclude that conflicts between the
Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided
by its own opinion of the Constitution.”); Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar.
4, 1861) (“[I]f the policy of the government, upon vital questions affecting the whole
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government
into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”).
18. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
19. Id. at 176–78. Chief Justice Marshall does not say that the writtenness of the
Constitution logically implies judicial authority to invalidate any law that a court believes
is unconstitutional. He does maintain that it “would subvert the very foundation of all
written constitutions” to declare that “if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden,
such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual.” Id. at 178
(emphasis added). Marbury advances other arguments for judicial review, but they are not
arguments based on the logic of all written constitutions. It would be perfectly logical, if
perhaps inadvisable, for a written constitution to place final authority for interpreting the
document in a legislature or some other non-judicial institution.
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Constitution and judicial precedent must always be resolved by
giving effect to the Constitution, not the precedent. After all, if
statutes enacted by the people’s representatives are always
trumped by the Constitution, it would seem to follow that mere
judicial opinions must also be trumped by the Constitution.
According to the Constitution itself, the “supreme Law of the
Land” includes the Constitution, statutes enacted pursuant to the
Constitution, and treaties. Conspicuously absent from this list is
any mention of judicial opinions.
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Marshall nowhere claimed
that the Court is or should be supreme in the interpretation of the
Constitution. Such an assertion did not appear until Cooper v.
Aaron in 1958.20 In practice, the Supreme Court has developed a
complex and flexible approach to the exercise of judicial review.
There is almost nobody who would seriously maintain today that
courts are obliged by the Constitution to enforce unconstitutional
statutes. But it is also true that very few would seriously maintain
that courts are always obliged to strike down statutes they think
are unconstitutional, even in the face of thoroughly settled judicial
precedent.
Presidents take the same general approach that the Supreme
Court has taken. In principle, Presidents always have the option
of refusing to enforce or comply with statutes they consider
unconstitutional, whether or not the Supreme Court agrees with
them. But they are not obliged to ignore or defy every such
statute. Similarly, the Constitution nowhere imposes on the
legislature an obligation to relentlessly impose its own
constitutional views by impeaching every executive and judicial
officer who acts in a manner that Members of Congress consider
unconstitutional.
One might think, with Redish, that leaving the President, the
Supreme Court, and the Congress with concurrent authority to
decide on the meaning of the Constitution is an invitation to
constitutional crises and ultimately to chaos or tyranny.21 History
demonstrates that this is not so. The simple fact is that each

20. 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958). In context, even that statement could be interpreted to
mean only that state courts are required to treat the holdings in Supreme Court decisions
as the supreme law of the land.
21. Redish puts the thought this way: “[W]ithout judicial supremacy, coordinacy
would be impossible” (p. 40).
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branch of government sometimes gets the last word and
sometimes does not.
The Supreme Court, for example, has lots of devices by which
it avoids trying to become the last word on all constitutional
questions. These include doctrines under which the Justices
sometimes decline to exercise judicial review, as well as countless
rulings that leave the other branches with broad discretion to
interpret their own constitutional powers.22
Like the courts, Presidents have sought to minimize conflicts
with the other branches. Over the years, for example, the
President’s legal advisors in the Justice Department have
developed an elaborate internal jurisprudence that largely
adheres to Supreme Court precedents. That jurisprudence
displays some independence from the views of the judiciary,
especially with respect to matters directly touching on the
President’s institutional interests, such as the scope of executive
authority. But the jurisprudence is memorialized in written legal
opinions that take judicial decisions very seriously and treat them
as dispositive on many issues.23
Presidents, moreover, have not felt compelled to exercise
every right they believe they have or that the Justice Department
tells them they have. There is a fundamentally important
distinction between claiming the authority to do something and
actually doing it.24 History shows that the people who have
occupied seats of power in all three branches have managed to
avoid the kind of war that might actually establish one branch as
the supreme and definitive interpreter of the Constitution.
II. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY UNBOUND
A. IMPEACHMENT
If such a war were ever conducted, the Constitution’s text
seems to indicate pretty clearly who should win. Congress has the
22. Well known examples include the political-question doctrine and the
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819).
23. These Justice Department legal opinions are purely advisory so far as the
President is concerned. The President is free to ignore or overrule them, and Presidents
sometimes do just that.
24. For a case study, see Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 95 (2007)
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authority to remove any officer, executive or judicial, for
“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”25
Why would one doubt that acting unconstitutionally could
properly be considered a high crime or misdemeanor? Or that
Congress has the authority to remove an officer who behaves in a
way that a sufficient number of its members believe is
unconstitutional?
Redish denies that this authority exists, and his explanation
reveals a lot about his theory of constitutionalism. He does not
deny that a President might lawfully be removed merely for acting
unconstitutionally. But he maintains that judges may be removed
only for “criminal behavior that threatens the integrity of the
judicial role,” and never for a decision reached in the course of
adjudication (p. 80). He justifies this double standard (which has
no basis in the Constitution’s text) on the ground that judicial
independence is so important that the impeachment power may
not be used in any way that could possibly threaten judicial
supremacy over the interpretation of the Constitution. The
Constitution’s supermajority requirement for conviction is not
nearly
enough
to
satisfy
Redish’s
demand
for
countermajoritarianism (p. 95).26
It’s worth pausing at this point to consider some implications
of Redish’s position. Suppose that five Justices voted to create a
constitutional right for a mother to have her child put to death
during the first week of its life in order to protect her physical or
mental health. As a matter of doctrine, this hypothetical is a very
short step beyond the Court’s current position on late-term
abortions,27 so it is not far-fetched in that respect. If the House of
Representatives impeached these Justices, Redish would have the
Supreme Court declare the indictment unconstitutional.28 It’s
unlikely, of course, that the Court would create a right to
infanticide until after some significant political demand for such a

25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
26. Redish describes the supermajoritarian impeachment process as “a majoritarian
check” (p. 100). Going even farther, he sometimes rejects the right of “society” to remove
judges from office for non-criminal misbehavior (pp. 78, 102). This seems to challenge what
I always thought was the truly fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the people.
27. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007).
28. See p. 80 (political-question doctrine should be inapplicable to congressional
impeachment decisions).
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right arose.29 But that suggests that Redish’s absolute rule against
impeachment for adjudicatory decisions is not needed. Ironically,
moreover, one reason that the Justices never issue decisions that
lead to their impeachment is probably that even they recognize
the flaws in Redish’s theory of absolute judicial immunity.30
If Redish has correctly interpreted the Constitution, of
course, it should be irrelevant whether the absolute immunity he
advocates is either necessary or salutary. How, then, does he go
about the task of interpretation? Redish insists on the importance
of the Constitution’s writtenness in his critiques of realists and
popular constitutionalists, and he expressly characterizes himself
as a “textualist” (e.g., p. 83). He also believes that the judiciary
lacks moral or legal authority to overturn legitimate political
choices by elected officials (pp. 3, 41). One therefore might expect
him to adopt the interpretive theory of originalism. This he
emphatically does not do. On the contrary, he says, “rigid
originalism should play no role in modern constitutional
interpretation,” apparently because it requires “archaeological
excavation” that is unnecessary and sometimes misleading (pp.
10, 18 & nn.19, 92 (emphasis added)).31
29. Redish could hardly object that this hypothetical is unrealistic. He maintains both
that his narrow definition of impeachable offenses is consistent with congressional practice
(p. 101) and that “one must shape constitutional interpretation to deal with problems that
theoretically may arise” (p. 228 n.94). Note, as well, that Redish has a very narrow view of
what kinds of non-adjudicatory behavior can justify impeachment: “criminal behavior that
threatens the integrity of the judicial role” (p. 80). Suppose that a Supreme Court Justice
had a late-term abortion that inadvertently resulted in a live birth. If she immediately
injected the baby with a lethal drug that she obtained from her physician, she could not be
impeached without proof that the homicide threatened the integrity of the judicial role.
That might be very hard to do, especially if the state prosecutor declined to indict her. If
she were impeached without such proof, Redish’s theory would require the Supreme Court
to declare the indictment unconstitutional, no matter how heinous the Justice’s behavior
seemed to most of the nation.
30. Cf., e.g., (Walter) Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993) (“Judicial
involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, is
counterintuitive because it would eviscerate the ‘important constitutional check’ placed on
the Judiciary by the Framers . . . [by] plac[ing] final reviewing authority with respect to
impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is meant to
regulate.” (citation to Federalist No. 81 omitted)).
31. I say “apparently” because Redish is quite cryptic about the reasons for his
rejection of originalism. Buried in one endnote are references to “a usually fruitless effort
to ascertain the narrow understanding of a group of drafters some 200 years ago” and to a
“largely futile attempt to constrain words by some narrow and unchanging historical
perspective” (p. 224 n.27). Whether these characterizations of originalism are accurate or
not, they seem to suggest why he would regard originalism as a source of misleading
archaeological excavations. It’s worth noting that Redish goes far beyond anything that
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In order to flesh out Redish’s interpretive approach, let’s
return to judicial review, which he thinks requires judicial
supremacy. It is easy to make a strong case for judicial review on
originalist grounds. Judicial review was practiced in Great Britain
for hundreds of years, its legitimacy was widely accepted in the
United States when the Constitution was adopted, and it was
therefore an aspect of the “judicial Power” conferred on the
Supreme Court by the Vesting Clause of Article III.32 Redish
himself alludes briefly to such “archaeological” evidence before
summarizing a “conceivable” argument based on the Due Process
Clauses and a “question begging” argument based on the
Supremacy Clause (pp. 24-25). Dissatisfied with all these
arguments, he concludes: “In truth, the most logical explanation
of judicial review is common sense, logic, and reverse engineering
from the structural Constitutional itself” (p. 25). This explanation
turns out to be very simple. The Constitution gives unelected
judges salary and tenure protections in order to create a formal
barrier against tyranny, and that barrier would be ineffective
unless the judges have final and binding interpretive authority
(e.g., pp. 26, 40).33
His treatment of judicial review exemplifies Redish’s
approach
to
constitutional
interpretation.
American
constitutionalism consists, he believes, of a core principle that he
calls “skeptical optimism,” along with the political apparatus that
the structural Constitution uses to effectuate that principle (p.
21).34 Skeptical optimism strikes me as a perfectly serviceable
shorthand for the spirit of what we call the Enlightenment, and
maybe even the spirit of the Christianity that dominated America
during the founding era. It is a lot harder to see how this general
outlook constitutes a principle that could help us discern the
meaning of constitutional language that is vague or ambiguous.
And if originalism seldom leads to unimpeachable answers, as
Justice Stevens said or implied in the Term Limits case, where Stevens engaged in
extensive archaeological excavation.
32. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Judicial Review and Judicial Duty: The Original
Understanding, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 169, 173 (2009).
33. At one point, Redish says that judges “would only be removable on impeachment
or for bad behavior” (p. 26). In light of his later rejection of claims that judges might be
removed by some means other than impeachment (pp. 81–88), I take this to be an editing
error.
34. As his terminology suggests, Redish thinks the founders optimistically believed
that a strong majoritarian government was needed to empower the people, but worried at
the same time about a tyranny of the majority (p. 21).
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Redish maintains, filling one’s soul with the spirit or attitude of
“skeptical optimism” will generate whatever answer one likes to
just about every constitutional question. With respect to the
proper scope of judicial independence, for example, should we be
optimistic about judges and skeptical about voters and elected
officials, or vice versa? Or, if one takes the sensible position that
we should be skeptical and optimistic about both, what degrees
and forms of skepticism and optimism are appropriate toward
each?
More promising is Redish’s suggestion that an appropriate
guide for the interpreter can be found through reverse
engineering the structural Constitution. He is right to identify
several ways in which our Constitution is deliberately and
manifestly different from Great Britain’s: it is written; it proclaims
its supremacy as positive law; it is formally alterable only through
a complex supermajoritarian process; and it creates a politically
insulated judiciary that interprets the Constitution (pp. 22-23).
This is a plausible basis from which to infer the legitimacy of
judicial review. But it is not an adequate basis from which to infer
judicial supremacy.
In order to see why, it’s helpful to focus on a difference
between the British and American constitutions whose
importance is easy to overlook. Judicial review is often and
mistakenly thought to be an American invention. British courts
refused to implement unconstitutional acts of the Crown, which is
one form of judicial review. Because Parliament served both as
the legislature and as the highest court in the land, ordinary courts
did not declare Acts of Parliament unconstitutional. It would have
been as improper for a mere court to declare a statute
unconstitutional as it would be for one of our inferior federal
courts to overrule a decision of our Supreme Court. When
American constitutions separated the highest judicial court from
the legislature, they created a potential for interbranch conflicts
between those who make statutory law and those who enforce
constitutional law. As it turned out, no serious conflicts arose for
a long time. Marbury’s exercise of judicial review was
noncontroversial, and it was not until Dred Scott that the Court
provoked political opposition by declaring a federal statute
unconstitutional.
Politically contentious exercises of judicial review obviously
became much more common after the ensuing civil war, and they
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are now routine. Strikingly, Redish never tries to show that even
the most intense of these controversies has actually threatened
the independence of the judiciary. And I don’t see how he could.
We have developed an informal norm against political
interference with judicial independence so strong that even
Franklin Roosevelt could not overcome it. Though his plan to
pack the Court was perfectly constitutional on its face, an
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress refused even to consider
it.35 This makes me wonder why Redish so aggressively argues that
“[t]he prophylactically insulated judiciary is the beating heart of
the structural brilliance that defines American constitutionalism”
(p. 17). It would make more sense to say that the Constitution’s
structural brilliance lies in the system that has produced a political
and legal culture in which no one branch has obtained absolute
sovereignty over the interpretation of the Constitution. The
“reverse engineering” that Redish favors leads more easily to the
departmentalism that he denounces than to the judicial
supremacy that he advocates.
Although Redish calls himself a textualist and a
traditionalist, it would be more accurate to call him a living
constitutionalist.36 He believes he has discovered in judicial
supremacy the spirit or beating heart of the Constitution, and that
a commitment to seeking the original meaning of the
Constitution’s text could only impede the task of working out the
implications of that discovery. Some of those implications turn out
to be so remarkable that one is almost tempted to think that an
idée fixe may be at work.
B.

LIFE TENURE

The arguments Redish marshals in favor of judicial
supremacy are extremely weak, but they do have a starting point
in the Constitution’s salary and tenure protections for federal
judges. Even if he goes too far in drawing inferences from the
constitutional text, these judges were certainly meant to enjoy a
very high degree of adjudicatory independence. As Redish
repeatedly and rightly emphasizes, this countermajoritarian
35. Even Redish does not seem prepared to say that it was unconstitutional for a
President to propose adding new seats to the Court.
36. Although he never uses this term to describe his approach to interpretation, he
does at one point explicate his textualism in a way that sounds very much like living
constitutionalism (pp. 97-99).
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element in the structural Constitution was meant to help protect
individuals from politically motivated invasions of their rights.
All of our nation’s state constitutions establish an
independent judiciary, but many of them make their judges more
politically accountable than federal judges are. Redish thinks this
is a really bad idea, and he focuses especially on retention
procedures that allow the voters to decide at intervals whether a
judge should remain on the bench. Although Redish barely seems
to recognize it, the designers of all American constitutions faced
a tradeoff in responding to two opposite dangers. Too much
political insulation allows judges to get away with defying the law,
up to and including the illegal adoption of virtual constitutional
amendments. Too little political insulation incentivizes judges to
shrink from faithfully enforcing laws to which large numbers of
voters may strongly object.
Redish may be right that the federal life-tenure arrangement
is better than the retention systems adopted by many states. But
he does not provide anything like the kind of empirical evidence
that would be needed to make a strong case for his position. Nor
does he try. Instead, he asserts that state retention systems violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not
surprisingly, he makes no effort to conduct the kind of
“archaeological excavation” that an originalist would think is
necessary. Rather, he assumes that due process requires a neutral
decisionmaker, argues that state judges subject to retention
procedures are inherently less neutral than judges who enjoy life
tenure, and concludes that such procedures are therefore
unconstitutional (pp. 114-116).
Redish recognizes that it is impossible to guarantee that
judges will be perfectly unbiased. He notes, for example, that all
judges have to be appointed by somebody, and that they will
naturally feel gratitude toward those to whom they owe their
appointment. In focusing as heavily as he does on the danger that
a judge will be biased by the incentives created by retention
systems, however, Redish pays no attention to the danger that a
judge will be biased by his own political or ideological views. This
is the hardest kind of bias to suppress, and English judges spent
centuries cultivating an ideal of resistance to external and internal
pressures to refrain from applying the positive law.37 Anyone who
37.

For the history, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
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thinks the dangers created by internal political and ideological
biases are insignificant must be reading federal judicial opinions
through some very rosy spectacles.38
The starting point for Redish’s discussion of personal bias is
a critique of Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,39 in which the
Court found that due process was violated when a state judge sat
on a case in which one of the litigants had made a large financial
contribution to the judge’s election campaign. Redish argues that
the risk of bias arising from retrospective gratitude, as in this case,
is smaller than the risk created by retention systems that generate
fear of future consequences for unpopular decisions. And because
these retention systems exist “out of tradition, not necessity” (p.
127), the Supreme Court should abolish them in the name of due
process.
If that argument is correct, it should follow that federal
judges should also be relieved from such prospective pressures to
the maximum possible extent. Any judge who hopes to be
promoted to a higher court faces an implicit pressure to please the
politicians who control such promotions. The effects are pretty
easy to see in the opinions of some federal judges, and it is
probably much harder to resist that pressure than for state judges
to stick to the law in the face of adverse public sentiment.40 It
would therefore seem that due process requires a rule that no
sitting or former judge may be promoted to a higher court. This
would obviously have some effects that might be undesirable,
38. Redish takes it to be self-evident that when faced with a choice between overand under-protection of a constitutional right, over-protection must be chosen if at all
possible (p. 127). But he does not seem even to recognize our constitutional right to be
free from unconstitutional laws illegally imposed on us by judges. Consider two of the most
prominent modern examples of judges who lost retention elections because of their judicial
decisions. Rose Bird and two other members of the California Supreme Court lost their
seats because they persistently frustrated the operation of the state’s capital punishment
laws. Three members of the Iowa Supreme Court lost a retention election after they voted
to create a right to same-sex marriage. In both cases, the unpopular decisions can also very
plausibly be described as willful defiance of the law. Redish does not provide a single
example of any judge having been removed from office for making lawful decisions that
proved to be unpopular.
39. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
40. Although it is no doubt true that a relatively small proportion of federal judges
are hoping for promotion in the near term, it is also true that the entire lifetime record of
any candidate for promotion is likely to be scrutinized with some care, not only by judge
pickers in the executive branch, but also by Senate staff and a variety of interest groups.
State judges subject to retention elections will almost never be called on to faithfully apply
the law in a case that is likely to become a matter of significant public controversy, let alone
likely to drive a majority of the voters to remove the judge from office.
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such as a total lack of trial court experience among appellate
judges. But life tenure also has some unquestionably undesirable
effects, such as allowing judges to get away with imposing their
personal political and ideological agendas on their fellow citizens.
While insisting that the logic of due process requires a radical
revamping of the judicial systems in many states, Redish refuses
to accept that the same logic requires a much more modest
alteration of federal practice. In one of his endnotes, Redish
concedes that federal judges could “conceivably” shape their
decisions to curry favor with those empowered to promote them
(p. 235 n.99). He then asserts that a rule against such promotions
would be “for a variety of obvious reasons, an untenable result”
(p. 235 n.99). He never tells us what those obvious reasons are,
and it is not obvious to me why such a rule would be “untenable.”
The functions performed by appellate judges, for example, are so
different from that of trial judges that nobody seems to think that
experience on a trial bench should be a prerequisite to serving on
an appellate court. Similarly, we have had many Supreme Court
Justices with little or no experience on a lower court, and it is
hardly obvious that such experience is even helpful, let alone
necessary, in performing the kind of work that the Court has
decided it wants to perform.
Here again, we can see why Redish is best characterized as a
living constitutionalist. Although he calls himself a textualist and
a traditionalist, his arguments for using the Supreme Court to
impose judicial life tenure on the states are not based on the text
of the Constitution, or on any tradition. Like so many other living
constitutionalists, Redish fashions an argument that permits him
to impute his own policy views to the Due Process Clauses. But
does he really take the structural Constitution seriously? Or the
importance of giving all adjudicators the independence of Article
III judges?
Apparently not. He dismisses concerns about federalism,
which is every bit as much a part of the structural Constitution as
judicial independence, on the ground that they are “questionbegging” (p. 112).41 Even more strikingly, this book is completely
silent about the massive amount of adjudication by the federal
41. The relevant endnote (p. 230 n.9) offers a nonsensical “id.” citation to a
concurrence by Justice Kennedy. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Caperton, and no
opinion in the case includes the language quoted in the endnote.
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government that takes place every day without anything close to
the independence that state judges enjoy. The federal government
deploys armies of executive branch officials to resolve cases in
which the rights of American citizens are at stake. This aspect of
the modern administrative state is, to put it mildly, highly
questionable in light of the structural Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.42 Can anyone really believe
that federal bureaucrats are more neutral than state judges
subject to retention elections? Redish’s proposed abolition of
judicial retention procedures resembles an effort to reduce air
pollution by banning cigarettes in Yellowstone Park, all the while
ignoring the gigantic billows of black smoke from a forest fire
caused by an open campfire.
C.

LEGISLATIVE FRAUD

The book’s neglect of the constitutional problems posed by
executive-branch adjudication is particularly striking because the
very next chapter asserts that the resolution of individual cases
falls within the judicial power by definition; it therefore belongs
to “the one branch vested with the ‘judicial power’” (p. 146).
Rather than attend to the implications of this principle with
respect to executive adjudication, Redish draws the following
novel inference: “the judiciary has the constitutional power and
obligation to assure that Congress not deceive the electorate as to
the manner in which its legislation actually alters the preexisting
legal, political, social, or economic topography” (p. 140). The
putative deception with which Redish is concerned here occurs
when a legislature enacts a procedural or evidentiary rule that
affects the operation of a substantive statute in a way that
transforms its “essence” (pp. 141, 158-162).43

42. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?
(2014). In a subsequent chapter, Redish assumes that hearings conducted by executive
officials can be consistent with due process because the Supreme Court has said so (pp.
191-92). He seems to think that this is permissible because review of constitutional
questions raised in these cases is available in Article III courts (p. 192). But the Supreme
Court is also available to review constitutional questions raised by decisions of state judges
who are subject to retention procedures. Redish never explains why the availability of
appellate review is sufficient in one case and not the other. His reliance on Supreme Court
case law seems, to use his term, question-begging.
43. Redish uses the term “DNA” to describe what he calls a statute’s “essence.” I do
not understand the metaphor, which may have some significance that has escaped me.
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Redish finds this theory lurking in the Supreme Court’s
notoriously confusing opinion in United States v. Klein.44 I will
pass over his lengthy analysis of the case for three reasons. First,
he does not claim that his theory is actually articulated in the Klein
opinion, and he acknowledges that the Court may not have “fully
grasped” the theoretical implications of what it did say (p. 142).
Second, the Court has never interpreted Klein the way Redish
does (p. 142). Third, it is apparent from his discussion that Redish
would think that his conclusions are dictated by the Constitution
and would therefore be valid even if Klein had never been
decided.
The essence of Redish’s reasoning is that basic democratic
theory requires legislators to be accountable to the public for their
votes. If they enact a substantive statute that says “A” and a
procedural or evidentiary rule that causes the effect of the statute
to be “B” or “not A,” the legislature has committed a “fraud on
the public” in which the courts should refuse to become complicit
(pp. 68, 154-156, 162-163).45
Redish offers only one example of such unconstitutional
behavior, which he finds in Michael H. v. Gerald D.46 The case
involved a California statute that established a presumption,
rebuttable only by the husband or wife, that a husband who is not
sterile or impotent is the father of a child born to his wife while
they were cohabiting. In this case, a blood test showed that a man
44. 80 U.S. 128 (1872). Klein declared unconstitutional a statutory provision whose
substance the Court described as follows: “an acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer,
shall be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but shall be null and void as evidence of
the rights conferred by it, both in the Court of Claims and in this court on appeal.” Id. at
144.
45. When it comes to fraud, Redish has very sensitive antennae. Without judicial
supremacy, he thinks, the Constitution would be “rendered worse than meaningless, for it
would then amount to a sham designed to defraud the populace into believing that the
majoritarian branches are checked when in reality the check would be illusory” (p. 62).
46. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Redish also discusses Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y,
503 U.S. 429 (1992), in which the Court interpreted Klein to allow Congress to refer to
specific pending cases in a statute that changes the law so long as it does not direct courts
to reach specific results in those cases under the previous law. Redish acknowledges that
it is “at least arguable” that Robertson was correctly decided, but says “it would probably
be wise” for the Court to announce a prophylactic rule forbidding Congress to direct
findings in specific cases (p. 158).
The chapter also includes a long paragraph that seems to set forth a hypothetical
involving tort law (p. 155), but I just could not understand what the author is talking about.
This chapter has many conspicuous errors, such as endnotes with no discernable
connection to the accompanying text, some of which may reflect foul-ups during the editing
or production processes. Maybe that’s what happened with the paragraph about tort law.
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with whom a married woman had had an adulterous affair was
probably the progenitor of a daughter born during her marriage
to another man. The former paramour and the daughter (through
a guardian ad litem) brought suit claiming that their due process
rights were violated because the California courts denied
visitation rights to the man who was probably the girl’s biological
father.
Unlike the Supreme Court, Redish believes the plaintiffs’
due process rights were violated. Why? He says that the provision
of California’s Evidence Code that established the presumption
of paternity “purports to have rights turn on the factual issue of
who the natural father is” (p. 70 & n. 89). Shockingly, he quotes
no language from this statute or anywhere else purporting to do
any such thing.47 As far as I can tell, and I admit I’m only guessing,
Redish thinks the evidentiary rule in the statute conflicts with the
substantive public policy that motivated the statute (see p. 70).
But he never tells us where or how California informed the public
about this supposed policy.
Why in the world would anyone think that a legislature
defrauded the public by adopting a statute that means exactly
what it says, and does not conflict on its face with any other law?
As near as I can tell, Redish believes that what California did is
like a consumer contract in which small-print boilerplate
deceptively alters the terms in larger print (p. 159). “Society does
not demand that all consumers possess the perspicacity of an
experienced attorney” (p. 159). But if the rights that Redish thinks
the Michael H. plaintiffs had been given by California were
written in large print, they also seem to have been written with
invisible ink. It would take a lawyer, not an ordinary consumer, to
see a conflict between what a statute says and what the unstated
public policy behind the statute is. And it takes a very bold lawyer
to call a plainly worded statute a fraud on the public.
Even apart from the mysteries surrounding Redish’s use of
Michael H., could it possibly make any sense for courts to treat
statutes as though they were consumer contracts? That would
seem to mean that legislatures are defrauding the public when
they use legal terminology that lay readers are unfamiliar with, or
when they rely on courts to apply canons of construction that lay
47. The statute that establishes the presumption of paternity, which Redish never
quotes, is set out in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117-18.

4 - LUND.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

64

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

2/25/18 11:59 AM

[Vol. 33:45

people do not know about. How many statutes will survive that
test?
Redish would undoubtedly resist this extension of his
argument. He says that there will likely be few instances of the
legislative deception that he thinks is unconstitutional (p. 162). He
even says that there is some validity to the suggestion “that this
chapter illustrates all too vividly what can happen to a Supreme
Court decision [viz. Klein] when scholars get a hold of it” (p. 164).
I’m afraid I have to add that this chapter illustrates what can
happen when a scholar thinks up a solution to a problem that has
not been shown to exist.
Apart from the absence of any evidence that Congress or
state legislatures actually defraud the public by enacting
procedural rules that alter the operation of substantive statutes,
this book has nothing to say about judicial behavior that really
does look fraudulent. Everyone whose job entails the study of
appellate opinions is familiar with sub silencio overrulings,
patently ludicrous characterizations of prior precedent, ridiculous
result-oriented distinctions between similar cases, and
interpretations of constitutional and statutory texts that would
never occur to a disinterested reader.48
If one wanted to find a genuine case of fraud on the public, it
might look a lot like National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius.49 In that case, Congress imposed a requirement that
some citizens purchase a certain kind of health insurance. The
requirement was enforced by what the statute called a “penalty,”
and justified by a series of statutory findings confirming that it set
forth a legal requirement in the exercise of congressional
regulatory power.50 Characterizing this so-called individual
mandate as a regulation, rather than a tax, was an important
element in a strategy designed to protect those who voted for the
Obamacare statute from political reprisals at the polls.51
The Supreme Court held that the mandate exceeded the
regulatory authority of Congress, from which it followed
inexorably that an enforcement penalty was also invalid.
48. I assume that most readers of Constitutional Commentary will have their own
favorite examples.
49. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
50. For citations, see id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE 96–102 (2013).
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Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion accepting
the Obama administration’s argument that the penalty could be
treated instead as an exercise of Congress’s taxation authority.
This flew in the face of the plain language of the statute. It flew in
the face of repeated statements by President Obama and the
Obamacare bill’s supporters that the individual mandate was not
a tax.52 And, as Chief Justice Roberts himself acknowledged, it
was an interpretation of the statutory language that he adopted
only because the regulatory requirement and accompanying
penalty that Congress had purported to adopt were
unconstitutional.53 If all of this was not a fraud on the public, it’s
a lot closer to one than the Michael H. example. And the part of
it that most closely resembles a fraud was the work of Chief
Justice Roberts, not the Congress.54
D. HABEAS CORPUS
Another kind of fraud on the public was apparently
committed by Congress, albeit unwittingly, when it proposed the
Bill of Rights. According to Redish, the Fifth Amendment
superseded the Suspension Clause of Article I.55 His legal
argument has a very simple structure: the Due Process Clause is
inconsistent with the Suspension Clause; the Fifth Amendment
post-dates the original Constitution; ergo, the Due Process Clause
repealed the Suspension Clause.
Anyone familiar with the history of the founding era would
probably wonder how this could be true. Redish does not pretend
that James Madison or anyone else involved in drafting the Bill of
Rights believed that they were repealing this or any other
provision of the original Constitution. Nor does Redish suggest
that anyone outside Congress had the slightest inkling of any
inconsistency between the Fifth Amendment and the Suspension
Clause. An originalist, moreover, could reconcile this historical
background with the constitutional text by arguing that the

52. See id.
53. 567 U.S. at 561–63.
54. Cf. p. 152 (“Congress might undermine the sound operation of the representative
democratic process by enlisting the judiciary as a co-conspirator in a plan to deceive the
electorate”).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2: (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”).
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essential elements of due process were already implied by the
separation of powers in the original Constitution.56
Redish, of course, claims to be a textualist, not an originalist.
But where is the conflict between the texts of the two provisions?
Whatever specific rights are protected by the Due Process Clause,
none of which are set out in its text, the Suspension Clause on its
face deals only with one particular remedy. The Suspension
Clause does not purport to authorize any deprivations of
whatever rights are entailed in due process, and the suspension of
a particular remedial writ does not authorize the Executive to
violate whatever due process rights a person may have. Redish
never responds to this obvious objection to his position,57 not to
mention other textualist objections that could be made, such as
one based on the canon that repeals by implication are disfavored.
Why is Redish sure that the Fifth Amendment has the
“textually unambiguous and inescapable” effect of repealing the
Suspension Clause (p. 167, emphasis added)?58 Tellingly, he does
not begin with the text of the Constitution but with what the
Supreme Court has said about due process (pp. 173-174). He then
asserts that suspension allows the Executive to ignore what the
Supreme Court has said. Ergo, the Fifth Amendment must be
deemed to supersede the Suspension Clause (p. 174). However
appealing the policy behind the conclusion may be, this is not a
textual argument.
Although Redish believes that this non-textual “textual
interpretation” provides sufficient support for his position, he also
56. See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please!: The Original Insignificance of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 611 (2018).
57. The objection should be obvious to anyone familiar with the opinions in the
Hamdi case, a decision to which Redish gives considerable attention in this chapter. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 594 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I do not see how
suspension would make constitutional otherwise unconstitutional detentions ordered by
the President. It simply removes a remedy.”). Oddly, the book has an endnote that refers
to an academic article by Trevor Morrison, who maintains that suspension of the writ shifts
responsibility for protection of due process rights to the Executive. Redish seeks to rebut
Morrison by asserting that history shows that “the executive is all too happy to lock
individuals up and throw away the key unless the courts step in and mandate individual
hearings” (p. 250 n. 88). Whatever validity there is in this unsubstantiated assertion, and
whatever relevance it may have to a living constitutionalist, it is emphatically not a textual
argument.
58. See also p. 184 (“Because the due process guarantee is unlimited and unqualified
in its reach, and appears in the form of a subsequently enacted amendment, it indisputably
supersedes the inconsistent directive in the Suspension Clause purely as a matter of textual
interpretation.” (emphasis added)).
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advances what he thinks is an equally powerful argument based
on the fundamental precepts of American constitutionalism (p.
179). Simply put, the argument is that “the Framers were centrally
concerned with the dangers of tyranny” and the Suspension
Clause would allow a President to become a tyrant (p. 180).59
Well, one wonders, why did the Framers put the Suspension
Clause in the Constitution? The answer Redish gives is a
classically living-constitution formulation: “[T]he core concepts of
our political theory were a work in progress at the time of the
framing. That the Framers were merely groping towards an
understanding of the central premises of American
constitutionalism is a concept that has evolved, been refined, and
gained force over the years” (p. 181).60
As we have come to expect by this point in the book, Redish
goes on at great length about the terrible things that a President
might do while the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. And, as we
also expect, he exhibits no concern at all about the possibility that
the courts might irresponsibly interfere with the public safety
during a rebellion or invasion. Those responsible for framing a
constitution would have good reason to worry about both
dangers, and our Framers might reasonably have chosen to
balance the competing desiderata differently than they did.61 I can
understand why a living constitutionalist might want the Supreme
Court to repeal the Suspension Clause. What I cannot understand
is why the rest of us should go along with the pretense that this
judicial amendment of the Constitution should be called an
“unambiguous and inescapable” dictate of the Constitution’s text
(p. 167).
III. CONCLUSION
The title of this book announces that it is about judicial
independence and the Constitution. The author believes that
59. Redish says that it “is difficult to imagine a starker example of tyrannical
government” than denying someone who has been arrested the benefits of the writ of
habeas corpus (p. 204). Just to pick a couple of specimens that come immediately to mind,
the regimes of Kim Jong Un and Pol Pot strike me as much starker examples.
60. See also p. 196 (arguing that the Framers did not devote “sufficient attention to
the text or the meaning of the Due Process Clause” but that they were “moving towards”
the conclusion that Redish has reached).
61. As Redish points out, there was a debate at Philadelphia about just this question,
and some very respectable statesmen argued against including the Suspension Clause in
the Constitution (pp. 171-173).
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“modern doctrine has too often failed to recognize the full
implications of American constitutionalism for the nature and
extent of judicial independence” (pp. 204-205). I do not think he
comes anywhere close to making his case. But I am also baffled
about why he tries to do so.
Judicial independence is an important part of our
constitutional system. It is also among the least threatened aspects
of that system. Redish never points to any serious attacks on the
adjudicatory independence of the courts. When I tried to think of
examples, the best I could come up with was Stuart v. Laird.62 This
case involved a statute that (1) imposed circuit-riding duties on
Justices who had been appointed before the statute took effect
and (2) abolished some lower courts, thus depriving several
Article III judges of their offices. The Court avoided ruling on the
constitutionality of the second provision, and it upheld the circuitriding provision. The decision came after Congress abolished the
Court’s 1802 term, and it may have resulted at least in part from
fear of what the new Jeffersonian Congress might do next.63
Whatever the motivations of the Justices, however, the one clear
lasting effect was that their circuit riding obligations continued for
another century. In itself, that was probably a good thing for the
nation, and the case did not set a judicial precedent for allowing
Congress to evade Article III’s tenure provision.
Congress has very powerful tools that it could use to bend the
federal courts to its will. The Constitution requires the Supreme
Court to exist, but Congress can alter the number of Supreme
Court Justices, as it has done repeatedly, and it can abolish
inferior courts, as it has also done in the past. Congress could
effectively emasculate the Supreme Court by depriving it of the
assistance of the inferior courts, manipulating its jurisdiction, or
altering the size of the Court in response to unpopular decisions.
Except for diminishing the salary of sitting judges, Congress can
do whatever it wants with judicial budgets. There are infinite ways
in which this power could be used to make the judicial life a lot
less pleasant than it is now.64 Congress could also bring back
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
63. The Justices had previously discussed among themselves whether they should
refuse on constitutional grounds to sit on circuit courts. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, 77–78
n.102 (1985).
64. At one point, Redish seems to indicate that he regards such budgetary retaliation
as constitutionally permissible (p. 57). Later, he seems to equivocate (p. 60).
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circuit riding and mandatory jurisdiction, both of which were
curtailed at the request of Justices who wanted to be free to decide
only the cases they wanted to decide, thus magnifying their power
to act as general superintendents of the nation.65
Congress never uses any of these powers, let alone its power
of impeachment, to punish judges for deciding cases differently
than Congress wants them decided. And it is not as though judges
are shy about making politically controversial decisions. The
enormous increase in the power of the federal judiciary, which
Congress has not just tolerated, but affirmatively facilitated, raises
a number of interesting political science questions. One can also
raise reasonable questions about whether this power has become
a tool of an oligarchic elite that is effectively undermining
democratic governance. But how can anyone seriously maintain
that the federal courts have too little independence, or that their
constitutionally appropriate independence is threatened in any
way?
Using the familiar tools of living constitutionalism, Redish
articulates principles that he thinks are implied by the spirit of the
Constitution, and he frequently invokes the philosopher’s stone
that we call “due process.” He then draws startling inferences
from the principles he has inferred. But why does he draw the
particular inferences set forth in this book? Living
constitutionalists usually have political views that are easy to
discern from the results to which their mode of interpretation
leads them. And that makes sense because a political agenda
provides a powerful reason to reject originalism and to disrespect
settled precedents. What makes this book very odd is the
absence—apart from a vague distrust of popular government and
a touching faith in federal judges—of any obvious political or
ideological agenda. In a certain way, this is a refreshingly
academic quality. If the book’s arguments were stronger than they
are, it would also be an admirably academic quality. But it is very
hard to see why one would make patently untentable arguments
in support of recommendations that would have only marginal
effects if they were adopted. This book thus seems entirely
unsuccesful either as an academic exercise or as legal advocacy.

65. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s
Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255 (2010).

